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PIERRE BAYLE. 
BY PROFESSOR L. LEVY-BRUHL. 
THE philosophy of the eighteenth century in France, taken as a whole, presents so striking a contrast with that of the seven-
teenth century that the passage from the one to the other would be 
hardly intelligible did we not meet, as early as the end of the seven-
teenth century, with thinkers who, though of secondary rank, were 
yet bold and original, and who distinctly heralded the approach-
ing era. In the seventeenth century speculative reason, having 
finally freed itself from Scholasticism and the authority of the an-
cients, declared its absolute independence and made the freest use 
of it. It attempted a rational construction of the universe, by inti-
mately uniting metaphysics and physics and endeavored to realise 
the ideal of an intuitive and deductive science, which should be to 
the totality of natural phenomena what mathematics is to numbers 
and figures. In religion it was independent in fact but respectful 
in form. With Descartes and Gassendi, it refrained from touching 
upon sacred subjects; with Malebranche and Leibniz it flattered 
itself upon having established the conformity of reason with faith. 
Political and social problems; at least in France, it carefully ab-
stained from entering upon,-doubtless from caution, but also be-
cause it felt that the method was lacking to enable it to do so suc-
cessfully. 
The eighteenth century presents a very different aspect. It is 
here difficult to discover what the prevailing philosophy really is 
for the precise reason that philosophy is everywhere,-in tragedies, 
novels, history, political economy. Everyone is more or less of a 
philosopher. Yet no one makes the least original effort to con-
ceive reality in its unity. Metaphysical problems are neglected, or 
at most are dealt with separately, without a thought of their mu-
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tual dependency and without any controlling idea to give to them 
unity and to render the results harmonious. They are no longer at-
tractive in themselves; the interest people seemingly take in them 
conceals an ulterior object. At the same time, the attitude of 
philosophers towards religion has totally changed. The majority, 
instead of seeking a peaceful compromise with revealed religion, 
assail it openly; many of them going so far as to attack natural 
religion, while they nearly all proclaim morals to be independent 
of religious dogma. Political, social, and pedagogical problems be-
come the chief objects of study with philosophers. As the Church 
had, from time immemorial, given undisp'lted solutions of these 
questions, the matter was, so to speak, a new one. People took to 
it eagerly. They were anxious to occupy this new and wide do-
main, which was but just opened, and rushed forward to take 
complete and immediate possession of it. At the same time the 
influence of the natural sciences, which were progressing more 
slowly but more surely, increased as new discoveries were made, 
and gradually prepared the way for a new form of philosophical 
speculation, which soon set in. 
The principles of Descartes were, as we have seen, in great 
measure responsible for the formation of a philosophy different 
from his own. Descartes himself sedulously avoided the discus-
sion of political and social questions; but that his successors should 
have so applied the philosophy of "clear ideas," was inevitable. 
In the same way, the precaution he had taken to "set apart" the 
truths of faith was not equivalent to a treaty of peace with the-
ology, accepted on both sides, and definitive. It was merely a 
truce, destined soon to be broken. The conflict was so inevitable 
that, even had theologians been perfectly reconciled to Cartesian-
ism, the strife would nevertheless have been brought on soon there-
after, by the natural development of philosophical thought alone. 
If Cartesianism was looked upon su·spiciously by Pascal, it did not 
alarm his friends at Port Royal: Arnauld and Nicole in their Logic 
showed themselves staunch Cartesians. Nor did the most illus-
trious of the leaders of the French Roman Catholic Church, Bos-
suet and Fenelon, conceal their sympathy for the philosophy of 
Descartes, being, as it seems, more desirous of finding Cartesian-
ism conformable to the teaching of the orthodox doctrine, than of 
combating it in the name of the latter. It was from the ranks of 
philosophers themselves that serious hostilities began. Pure Car-
tesians these opponents were not i but they followed, more boldly 
than Descartes himself, the way he had laid open; and if they dif-
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fered from him, it was chiefly in applying his method and princi-
ples at the very points where he had abstained from so doing. 
On the other hand there had been running, throughout the 
seventeenth century, a more or less hidden, but uninterrupted, 
undercurrent of opposition to the spiritualistic philosophy, which 
was then predominant, and above all to Christian philosophy. 
Being Epicureans in spirit, taste, and often in morals, and unbe-
lievers in matters of religion, the "libertines" were naturally 
drawn to doctrines which were in accordance with their tenden-
cies. They welcomed the empiricism of Gassendi; they would 
readily have espoused materialism, had the latter openly declared 
itself, and the most intelligent among them were not long in guess-
ing the advantage which the cause of unbelief would draw from the 
method and physics of Descartes. All this, however, was not 
worked out, made clear, and openly presented to the public. To 
find the real precursors of the philosophy of the eighteenth cen-
tury, we must go to the last quarter of the seventeenth. There 
then appeared two minds quite different from each other in all 
things save in one: that they both sowed many seeds which were 
soon to bear fruit. These meh were Bayle and Fontenelle. 
If by "philosopher" we understand a man whose ideas con-
cerning the great metaphysical problems form a definite system, 
Bayle must be refused that name, for he pleads the natural weak-
ness of the human mind, and takes refuge in a modest kind of scep-
ticism. He should rather be called a scholar, a commentator of 
the ancients, a historian of theological controversies, and, above all, 
a journalist. Nothing interests and diverts him more than the 
Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres. He was born a Protestant, 
was converted to Roman Catholicism, but almost immediately after 
relapsed to Protestantism, on which account not being allowed 
to dwell in France, he finally fixed his residence in Rotterdam. 
He was not a daring man, at least in no respect did he appear so. 
His aspect was rather that of a person of the sixteenth century 
than of one of the eighteenth. He published large folios, full of 
learned discussions, and loved to point out and correct the mis-
takes of other scholars whose works nobody read. He liked not 
only history, but the crumbs of history, half buried in the dust of 
dictionaries. Such a universal and greedy curiosity cannot but 
seem harmless; and if peradventure a bold expression here and 
there causes the reader to prick up his ears, he is soon reassured. 
It required a keen insight to discover, amid such inexhaustible and 
minute erudition, constantly busied with almost forgotten things, 
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an engine of war destructive of nearly all that the seventeenth cen-
tury held certain and sacred. Nevertheless that engine was there, 
or at least it came from there. And Voltaire had good reason for 
eulogising the immortal Bayle as "the pride of the human spe-
cies. " 
One neither can nor ought to give a systematic account of 
ideas which their own author explicitly neglected to unite into a 
system. But Bayle's ideas, though not strictly linked together, 
are yet coherent. They centre about certain leading points, to 
which Bayle always reverts even when we least expect him to do 
so; and these points themselves have as ·a common centre-
namely, the relations between revelation and reason, with all the 
consequences which the solution of that question involves. 
Bayle boldly asserts at times that there can be no such thing 
as opposing reason. For there is, he declares, a distinct and vivid light which shines upon all men the moment they open the eyes of 
their attention: it is God Himself, the essential and substantial 
Truth, who then enlightens them immediately. It is in vain for 
one to try to deny this light. There are axioms which we cannot 
question, however hard we may try. We cannot believe that the 
whole is not greater than the part. Even though the opposite 
statement should be cited in Scripture a hundred times, man, 
such as he is, would not believe it. Therefore let nobody say 
that theology is a queen to which philosophy is a serving-maid 
merely; for the theologians themselves, by their very behavior, 
confess that philosophy is the queen and theology the servant. 
Hence the exertions and contortions which they inflict upon their 
minds to avoid being accused of a conflict with genuine philosophy. 
They would certainly not exert themselves so much if they did not 
tacitly admit that the authority of any dogma not confirmed, exam-ined, and recorded in the supreme parliament of reason and natu-
rallight, is "wavering, and fragile as glass." 
Had Bayle always spoken thus he would have not only pre-
saged but forestalled the eighteenth century. But then he would have shocked the great majority of his contemporaries. Being con-
demned as irreligious and impious, he would have been far less 
read, and his influence would have been infinitely more restricted. 
He usually speaks a much more cautious language. Not only is 
he a believer, but he repudiates utterly the accusation of heresy. 
He objects to being mistaken for a Socinian, who refuses to be-
lieve in the Trinity and the Incarnation as contrary to naturallight. 
He even goes further. In the case of a conflict between 
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revelation and reason, the latter must yield. For, could reason 
lead us to a knowledge of truth, the token of this would be evi-
dence. Now there are things entirely evident which a Chris-
tian rejects as false. Thus, says Bayle, you reject the axiom of 
identity when you accept the Trinity, the Eucharist, and Trans-
substantiation. Those who lived before the Gospel did not hesi-
tate to accept as true some very evident propositions; but the 
mysteries of our theology have shown that these propositions, in 
spite of their evidence, are false. Let us profit by this lesson, and, 
in order not to fall into errors like those of the heathen, and thus 
less excusable, let us hold nothing as certainly true, save what is 
taught by the Church. 
But let us notice the very special motives which Bayle gives 
for this attitude, apparently so submissive. Let us hear him speak 
to philosophers and theologians by turns. "Do not try to under-
stand mysteries," he says to the former; "if you could understand 
them they would be mysteries no longer. Do not even try to lessen 
their apparent absurdity. Your reason here is utterly powerless; 
and who knows but that absurdity may be an essential ingredient of 
mystery? Believe, as Christians; but as philosophers, abstain." 
And, turning to theologians: "You are quite right in demanding 
that we should believe; but make this demand in the name of au-
thority only, and do not be so imprudent as to try to justify your 
belief in the eyes of reason. God has willed it so, God has done 
so: therefore it is good and true, wisely done, and wisely permit-
ted. Do not venture any further. If you enter into detailed rea-
sons for all this you will never come to an end, and, after a thou-
sand disputes, you will be compelled to fall back upon your original 
reason of authority. In this matter, the best use to make of reason 
is not to reason. Moreover, if you condescend to discuss the point, 
you will be beaten. You wish that truth, that is, revelation, should 
always have the best reasons on its side. You wish this to be so, 
and you imagine it to be so. What a gross mistake! How could 
a theologian'S answers regarding mysteries, which are beyond the 
reach of reason, be as clear as a philosopher's objections? From 
the very fact of a dogma being mysterious and utterly incompre-
hensible to weak human understanding, it naturally follows that 
our reason will combat it with very strong arguments, and can find 
no other satisfactory solution than the authority of God. 
"This is precisely what theologians do not often admit. Be-
cause I think the reasons they give in favor of the dogma are 
weak, they conclude that I do not believe in the dogma. I should 
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not indeed believe if God had not bidden me to do so; but He 
commands and I submit. But He does not bid me hold demon-
strations as sound when they are not. Theologians must choose: 
either they must affirm their dogmas in the name of a supernatural 
light, without discussion; or, if they discuss them, they must not 
assume that they alone have the privilege of possessing truth. But 
they nearly always adopt a third method: they choose to discuss, 
and pretend to be right beforehand. If anyone candidly and un-
disguisedly points out the strength of the contrary opinion, he 
makes himself odious and suspicious. Indeed, even theologians 
themselves scruple to state the strongest arguments urged against 
them, lest these should produce too forcible an impression upon 
the reader. These arguments they conceal, out of charity and zeal 
ftJr truth. Was not Cardinal Bellarmin reproached for his candid 
statement of the reasons alleged by heretics, on the ground that it 
was prejudicial? " 
If therefore a theologian desires to act prudently, while re-
maining sincere, he must abstain from entering upon a discussion 
in which he is sure not to prevail. He must present mysteries as 
they are, that is, as incomprehensible and absurd. The Christian 
will nevertheless believe in them, since they were revealed by God 
Himself. It is his sole reason for believing in them: but fortu-
nately this reason is indisputable. One does not raise objections 
against God. 
Yet Bayle did raise objections; and the strictures which he 
preferred against Providence elicited, as everybody knows, the 
Thlodide of Leibniz. According to Bayle, if we look upon things 
in a human way, i. e., from the point of view of mere reason, the 
partisans of Providence find it dIfficult to prove that everything in 
the universe is the work of Providence, and equally difficult to de-
fend themselves against the Manicheans, who maintain that a prin-
ciple of good and a ptinciple of evil are continually at strife in the 
universe, and that neither is able to triumph over the other. No 
doubt, as God is all-powerful and all- bounteous, his work cannot 
but be the best possible, and we thence naturally infer the exist-
ence of Providence. But does experience confirm this reasoning? 
It does not: we see that man is wicked and miserable. Was the 
Creator unable or unwilling to make him otherwise? In both cases 
it is very difficult to defend Providence. Were there nowadays, 
says Bayle, Marcionites as skilled in disputation as are either the 
Jesuits or the J ansenists, they would not have advanced three syl-
logisms ere they had compelled their adversaries to confess that 
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they did not understand their own assertions, and that we come 
here to the verge of the unfathomable abyss of the sovereignty of 
the Creator, in which our reason is lost, there remaining nothing 
but faith to uphold as. A pagan philosopher would here have an 
advantage over the Christian. 
It is evident that evil should be prevented, if possible. Now 
God does not prevent all the disorders in the world, and yet it was 
most easy for Him to do so. It is also evident that a non-existent 
creature cannot be an accomplice to an evil deed, and it ought not 
in justice to be punished later on therefor. And yet, does not God 
allow all men to suffer the consequences of the original sin? Can 
this sin justify all the sufferings in the world? The conclusion is: 
Believe in Revelation. "Revelation is the only store-house from 
which arguments can be produced against such people; by it 
alone can we refute the so-called eternity of the evil principle." 
Leibniz had much ado to refute Bayle's objections. He shows 
indeed that the hypothesis of the Manicheans is shallow and that 
nothing is easier and more insignificant than to suppose a special 
principle in order to explain facts which puzzle us. But this 
Bayle is perfectly willing to grant him. Does Leibniz in his turn 
succeed in proving man's liberty and vindicating Providence? 
Hardly. The liberty which Leibniz recognises in man is a form 
of determinism merely; and his proposed explanation of the exist-
ence of evil in the universe, perhaps the least unsatisfactory that 
could be given, has but one fault; but the fault is a serious 
one. It forces its readers into pessimism. If this world be indeed 
the best of all possible worlds, Candide is not wrong in thinking it 
bad. We must therefore agree with Bayle that Revelation is our 
only resource here, and that reason, pure and simple, does not 
bear out the same conclusion. 
But, one might object, the origin of evil, the cause of sin, and 
the relation of God to the world, are purely speculative questions, 
raised only by metaphysicians; and if reason finds it no easy thing 
to agree with Revelation on these points, it has quite as much dif-
ficulty in agreeing with itself when thrown on its own resources. 
Human reason, says Bayle, is a principle of destruction and not of 
edification; it is fitted only for raising doubts, and for evasions. 
"It therefore matters little if it runs counter to Revelation on 
problems which are beyond its reach. At least we clearly see that 
the two agree on questions connected with practical life, that faith 
engenders virtue, and that religion sanctions the supreme rule of 
conduct. Here no difficulties or bbjections appear. 
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True, says Bayle, but on one condition: religion must teach 
nothing contrary to morals. No doubt it is unlikely to do so; yet 
sometimes it does. Indeed have we not heard Fathers of the 
Church declaring, and contemporary priests repeating after them, 
that compulsion should be used to bring refractory people to the 
orthodox faith? Hence sprang the persecutions against heretics, 
the dragonades; hence the Protestants were hunted, pillaged, im-
prisoned, sent to the galleys, their children kidnapped, and their 
clergymen hanged; hence all the other methods of violent conver-
sion set in motion when the Edict of Nantes was revoked. Now, 
not only are these proceedings absurd and even prejudicial to their 
own end; not only are these persecutions cruel and abominable, 
but the maxim that justifies them is based on a wrong principle. 
God cannot have said" Compelle z"ntrare." Just as there is no 
right against right, there is no Revelation against Revelation. 
Now, in moral matters, the first revelation is that of the conscience, 
"the true light which lighteth every man which cometh into the 
world." 
Bayle is here decidedly more affirmative than usual, and the 
cause is evidently the indignation he feels at beholding the perse-
cutions. "If anybody presumes to assert that God has revealed 
to us a moral maxim in direct opposition to the first principles of 
all morals, we must deny the assertion, and maintain that such a 
person is misinterpreting the text, and that one ought rather to re-
ject the testimony of one's criticism and grammar than that of one's 
reason. God cannot contradict himself. If the Scripture does not 
agree with our conscience, it is because we misunderstand the 
Scripture. And whatever contests may arise, conscience must 
always have the last word. For instance, it tells us that sincere 
ignorance is guiltless, and that a man cannot be responsible for a 
fault which he commits, without knowing that he commits it. We 
cannot therefore believe that a heretic or even an infidel, if he is 
sincere, can be punished by God for anything but for evil deeds 
which he may have done while knowing them to be evil. As for 
the deeds he may have done with a secure conscience-I mean a 
conscience which he has not himself maliciously blinded-I cannot 
be persuaded that they are crimes. 
Likewise, the stories in the Bible are not always edifying. If 
they shock my conscience, shall I abstain from condemning them? 
Because David, for instance, partook of God's inspiration, shall I 
not look upon him as a murderer, an ungrateful man, an adulterer? 
If the Scripture, in relating a deed, blames or praises it, nobody is 
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allowed to appeal from its judgment; we must all make our praise 
and blame conform to the pattern of the Scripture. But if the Holy 
Ghost has not qualified it we must not hesitate to censure what 
we think is a crime. There is no medium course: either such ac-
tions are worthless, or they are not wrong. Of these alternatives, 
our conscience can accept only the first. 
Further, viewing the question more generally, religious faith 
does not seem to have any influence whatever upon men's man-
ners. We have only to look about us. If we examine the morals 
of Christians, their lewd deeds, their scandals, their craftiness, and 
all that they do in order to procure money, or to obtain offices, or 
to supplant competitors, we shall find that they could hardly be 
more licentious, even if they did not believe in immortality. We 
shall find that, as a rule, they abstain only from such deeds as 
would expose them to infamy, or to the gallows, two checks which 
might restrain the corruption of a godless man as easily as it does 
theirs. A great many rogues and scoundrels believe in the immor-
tality of the soul, whereas many godly and righteous men do not. 
Soldiers may be irreproachable in their faith, and indulge in all 
sorts of excesses. This is also seen in some women. There is 
nothing inexplicable about it. It is not the general opinions of the 
mind which determine our actions: it is the present passions of 
the heart; and, as the English psychologists of the nineteenth cen-
tury very rightly say, "cognition does not produce action." Thus 
(always excepting those who are led by God's spirit), the faith a 
man has in a religion is no guarantee for his conduct. On the con-
trary, it is often quite apt to rouse in his soul anger against those 
who think differently, fear, and a kind of zeal for devotional prac-
tice, in the hope that outward actions, and a public confession of 
the true faith, will screen his disorderly life and gain pardon for 
it some day. 
Thence arise consequences which we can hardly deny Bayle, 
and which are momentous ones. If believing in certain dogmas 
has no necessary influence on the conduct of man, we may truly 
say that morals are independent of belief. If Christians who are 
"irreproachable as regards faith" lead an evil life, we must needs 
infer that rightful conduct is not inseparable from orthodoxy. We 
may therefore imagine a state composed of men believing neither 
in the existence of God nor in an after-life. Were they, however, 
zealous in preserving the public good, in checking malefactors, in 
preventing quarrels, in upholding the rights of widows and Ot;-
phans, in encouraging fairness in business, who can doubt but such 
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a state would be a highly civilised one? Throughout the eighteenth 
century this hypothesis of a "society of atheists" proposed by 
Bayle, is discussed, and though some, as Voltaire, for instance, 
may have been made uneasy by it, it still remains, for many others, 
a sort of ideal. 
Recapitulating Bayle's views of the mysteries of religion and 
of belief in the supernatural, it appears that from the point of view 
of knowledge, such mysteries are offensive to reason and seem ab-
surd; in a moral point of view, they do not make man any better, 
and are, to say the least, useless. What is to be inferred from 
this? That we may dispense with the belief in the supernatural 
and with mysteries; that we must seek what is good and true by 
human reason alone? Far from it. Bayle's conclusion is in direct 
opposition to this. Behold, he says in substance, the weakness 
and helplessness of human reason! If God did not teach us the 
truth, would our reason bring us to it? Reason is very far from it, 
and is ignorant of the ways that lead to it. Therefore, how much 
gratitude do we owe to Divine Kindness, that has especially re-
vealed to us through the Scripture what we should never have dis-
covered by ourselves and what would even seem to us absurd and 
unacceptable, were it not corroborated in this way. 
One cannot carry submission farther. How can a man be sus-
pected of impiety who does not hesitate a moment to silence rea-
son when Revelation speaks? Still we may question whether this 
submission is without reserve, if this respectfulness comes from the 
heart or only from the lips. If he is sincere why does not Bayle, 
after the example of Malebranche, seek to make the inward revela-
tion, which is our reason and conscience, agree with the outward 
revelation, which is the Scripture? Why does he purposely insist 
on the impossibility of making acceptable to reason what religion 
commands us to believe? And if insincere, his language becomes 
a dreadful irony. Then Bayle's defence of religion looks like an 
organised attack upon it: when he speaks of the "weakness and 
helplessness of reason," he really means the incomprehensibility 
and absurdity of revelation. In a word, with a show of deep re-
spect, he patiently destroys one after another, all motives for be-
lieving in Christian dogmas. When he has finished, revealed re-
ligion can no longer hold its own; it is on the verge of ruin. 
Therefore the works of Bayle, particularly his Dictionary, were 
an inexhaustible store for the unbelievers of the eighteenth cen-
tury. To take but one instance among a thousand, this is how he 
foreshadows those who are to take advantage of the defects in 
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the sacred texts. "Were such an account to be found in Thucy-
dides or Livy, all critics would unanimously conclude that the 
copyists had transposed the pages, forgotten something in one 
place, repeated something in another, or inserted spurious pas-
sages amidst the work of the author. But we must beware of such 
suspicions when the Bible is in question. Nevertheless, there 
have been persons bold enough to maintain that all the chapters or 
verses in the First Book of Samuel do not occupy the place they 
originally had." Suffer this cautious remark to pass and all of 
modern Biblical exegesis follows. 
It accordingly matters little that Bayle is incapable of system-
atic thought; that he appears now as a Cartesian, and now as a Pyr-
rhonian, that at one time evidence dispels his doubt, and that 
again his doubt overcomes all evidence; and that he actually seems 
to take pleasure in these contradictions. The eddies no not pre-
vent us from clearly perceiving the direction of the stream. Bayle 
is bent on nothing less than breaking up the system of belief and 
principles commonly accepted by his predecessors and contempo-
raries. This system was one of "Christian-rationalism." Bayle 
shows that a choice is imperative: either one must be a rationalist 
and cease to be a Christian; or be a Christian, and forego reason 
altogether. Scriptural texts had been relied on: Bayle gives us 
to understand that these texts are not proof against criticism. Re-
ligion had been looked upon as the basis of morals: Bayle proves 
that morals depend solely upon the conscience, and that religion, 
even the true religion, has no influence whatever upon men's con-
duct. It was thought-at least in France-that royalty was of di-
vine right; but, says Bayle, "if we do not more often see kings 
dethroned, it is because the nations have not been worked upon by 
clever enough intrigues." We might make the enumeration longer: 
for the" prejudices" were not few that Bayle attacked. No one, 
indeed, was to go further than this precursor of the Enlighten-
ment. And even in our days his conception of morals as independ-
ent of religion and metaphysics seems to many people dangerously 
bold. 
